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The Constitution's Second Century
The Shift in Emphasis from Property Rights
to Personal Rights
The Honorable Joseph F. Weis, Jr. *
We celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of the Constitution
this year confident that it will survive for at least another hundred
years. As is true of many things American, the observance of the
occasion has devoted more than enough attention to the historic days
of 1787 when the document was drafted. We have been treated to
fascinating bits of trivia about the personalities of the men who
attended the convention and, I fear, exaggerated appraisals of the
original draft.
We know that it is the oldest written national constitution still in
effect, but we are not really surprised it has continued to be viable
thus far. Perhaps that is due to an almost childish confidence that
the American people have in the Constitution-at least today.
It does not diminish our deep regard for the Constitution, as it
emerged in 1787, to admit that it had serious failings. It was, after
all, a product of 200 years ago and some concepts that were accept-
able, or at least tolerated at that time, are no longer so today. The
Constitution's condonation of slavery, for example, comes to mind.
It is also not disrespectful to point out that the 1787 draft of the
Constitution basically looked to the interest of the propertied class.
A stable central government, sound currency, a unified foreign policy
and freedom of trade between the states were essential if the new
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nation was to prosper economically. And it was to these ends that
the Constitution primarily addressed itself.
It was not an easy task-even at the convention the divergent
interests of the predominantly agricultural class were pitted against
the emerging industrial sector; the entrenched political forces in the
small colonies fought vigorously and successfully against the more
populous and powerful larger colonies. To resolve these conflicting
forces, compromises were an absolute necessity, and, by and large,
they have proved workable, although at times, even today, question-
able.
That is not to say, however, that the implementation of the
Constitution has gone smoothly and without a struggle. The success-
ful struggle for ratification did not quiet all opposition and did not
guarantee success to some of the delicate compromises reached before
1789. Those who ardently championed the sovereign prerogatives of
the individual states reacted with suspicion to the new central gov-
ernment and were ever alert to protest its increasing power-an
attitude which the federalist articles cited as an argument for ratifi-
cation.
But the Constitution did not stop growing in 1789. It has been
augmented and enlarged, mostly in the courts, although some signif-
icant amendments have been added over the years. The role of the
courts should not be surprising because the provisions and ambiguities
of the Constitution had to be interpreted and applied. That is the
task of the courts.
The Constitution of today, in reality, consists not only of the
original text but of significant court decisions over the years. To
gain some understanding of what is meant by constitutional rights
today requires a review of some of the important cases. In the limited
time available that process will necessarily be cursory, but I believe
will give some sense of the development that has occurred in the last
two hundred years.
Obviously, too, we cannot explore all the areas in which consti-
tutional law has played a decisive role so I will focus on the shift
from the courts' early emphasis on property rights to the later
attention to what might be called personal rights that will largely be
a historical and chronological review rather than a philosophical one.
Too often today the importance of the historical antecedents have
been overlooked and misunderstood. This is simply another example
of the adage that to understand the present it is necessary to know
what happened in the past.
The first case of real significance was not long in reaching the
Supreme Court. In 1793, just four years after the Constitution was
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ratified, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), the
Supreme Court permitted a suit against an unwilling state in the
federal courts. The opposition from the states was swift and vocif-
erous, and within two years the eleventh amendment prohibiting such
suits was ratified. Those who had predicted the incursion of federal
law and federal courts into state sovereignty had rallied quickly to
stop the trend at the outset.
Not surprisingly, commercial interests were the subject- of a number
of the early cases in the Supreme Court. Gibbons, v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), denied a state the right to interfere with state
commerce-in that case a steamboat plying the Hudson River. In
McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Court,
under Chief Justice Marshall, barred a state from imposing a heavy
tax on the bank of the United States, a federal institution.A sound
currency had been threatened by state action and the Court moved
decisively to assert federal supremacy in this vital field. In Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), the Court overruled
a state court which had not properly respected treaty obligations to
honor the title of English landowners.
These cases had a common thread-strengthening of the powers
of the federal government in matters of particular interest to the
concepts of sound currency, interstate commerce, and obligations
under treaty even when they involved our former enemy.
During this era, too, the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), established the right of judicial review,
the power of federal courts to declare statutes unconstitutional. This
case was tremendously important in establishing the separation and
distribution of power within the federal government.
Today, when people speak of constitutional rights, they generally
refer to the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments. They enumerated
such rights as personal liberty, freedom of the speech, press, religion,
entitlement to due process, and jury trials. In this area, the focus
during the early years was on the states and the state courts.
In the case of Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833),
Chief Justice Marshall declared that the fifth amendment prohibition
against taking of property without compensation applied only to the
federal government and not to the states. He said that the Consti-
tution was established by the people for themselves, for their own
government, and not for the government of individual states. As he
read it, the Bill of Rights contained no expression indicating an
intent to apply them to the state governments.
Thus, during the time that the Court was steadily increasing the
power of the federal government in trade, industry, and commerce,
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it refused to expand individual rights under the federal constitution,
leaving those interests within the states' supervision.
But some of the conflicts which had been papered over, or should
I say parchmented over, in 1787-89 continued to fester- slavery,
state autonomy, and resistance to a central government- and they
could not be resolved by the courts.
The refusal of Georgia to accept Supreme Court orders to respect
Indian Territory in the 1820's, South Carolina's resistance to the
Tariff Act in the 1830's, and refusal by the Northern states to honor
the Fugitive Slave Act, particularly in the 1850's, were indications
of the smouldering fires beneath.
In 1857, Lord Macaulay, the English historian, wrote in a letter
to an American:
It is quite plain that your government will never be able to restrain a
distressed and discontented majority. For with you, the majority is
the government, and has the rich, who are always a minority, abso-
lutely at its mercy. The day will come when in the state of New York,
a multitude of people, none of whom have had more than half a
breakfast, or expect to have more than half a dinner, will choose a
legislature. Is it possible to doubt what sort of a legislature will be
chosen? On one side is a statesman preaching patience, respect for
vested rights, strict observance of public faith. On the other, a dem-
agogue ranting about the tyranny of capitalists and usurers, asking
why anybody should be permitted to drink champagne and to ride in
a carriage. Which of the two candidates is likely to be preferred by a
working man? There is nothing to stay you. Your Constitution is all
sail and no anchor. As I said before, when a society has entered on
this downward progress, either civilization or liberty must perish. Either
some Caesar or Napoleon will seize the reins of government with a
strong hand; or your Republic will be a fearfully plundered and laid
waste in the twentieth century as the Roman Empire was by barbarians
who came from without, and that your Huns and Vandals will have
been engendered within your country by your own institutions.
But Macaulay's prediction was wide of the mark. He was correct
in foreseeing a constitutional crisis. But it came, not from the
problems to which he had cited to, but the ones I have mentioned
which exploded into the Civil War. What the courts and the Con-
stitution could not resolve was finally settled by a bloody conflict
just as we were about to enter into the Constitution's second century.
The original text of the Constitution grew out of war-the Revo-
lution, and the second significant phase was also the result of armed
conflict-the bloody civil war. The changes brought about in the
second hundred years were almost as radical as those of the first.
The most immediate result of the Civil War was the enactment of
the thirteenth amendment abolishing slavery in the United States,
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and Congress' passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, destined
through a series of modifications to become a far ranging source of
federal power 100 years later.
The Reconstruction era was a controversial one. The radical poli-
ticians of the North were not inclined to be conciliatory and the
Southerners reacted with bitterness. The newly freed Black slaves
were abused by Southern whites and the carpetbaggers from the
North were treated with violence. The South6rn states appeared
unable or unwilling to enforce the laws and the Klu Klux Klan ruled
by terror.
Congress reacted by drafting the fourteenth amendment. It is the
most sweeping of all those modifying the Constitution, and one
which would forever alter the balance of power between the states
and the federal government. As you will see, the words of this
amendment are quite important and I will cite just a few clauses:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor dery to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Just what these provisions would mean in practice would take
years to determine.
Although the language is broad, the fourteenth amendment's first
test in the Supreme Court resulted in a narrow interpretation that
disappointed its avid supporters. In 1873, the Court decided the
Slaughterhouse cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), a controversy
arising out of a Louisiana statute granting a monopoly to one
company operating a slaughterhouse in New Orleans. It is interesting
that this significant case did not involve civil rights as we think of
them today but was concerned with a purely economic question-
the right to conduct a business in a free enterprise system.
The companies which had been denied the right to compete com-
plained that the Louisiana law deprived them of their right to the
privileges and immunities and equal protection of the law as guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court rejected
that argument and decided that the fourteenth amendment applied
only to national citizenship and not to the rights granted by state
law.
The rights which the Court considered to be federal in character
were such fundamental matters as the right to petition the federal
government, the use of seaports and navigable waters, access to the
federal courts, to the writ of habeas corpus, as well as protection
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on the high seas and on foreign soil. But for protection of the bulk
of individual liberties, a person had to look to the states and state
law, not the federal constitution. This very conservative reading of
the fourteenth amendment put off for many years the move to give
the federal government and the federal courts a dominant role in
safeguarding individual rights.
In 1882 and 1883, in two cases, the Supreme Court further re-
stricted the ability of the federal government to move into the civil
rights field. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), the Court decided that the
Public Accommodations Act of 1875 passed by Congress was uncon-
stitutional because it applied to private acts of racial discrimination.
The Court concluded that the fourteenth amendment authorized
Congress to act only when the state itself was guilty of discrimination
or enacted discriminatory legislation.
But there was a portent of things to come. In 1880, in the case
of Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the Court held
that racially-based discrimination in the selection of a jury in a state
court was unconstitutional. Thus, the Court intervened in applying
federal constitutional provision in a trial conducted in a state court
enforcing the state criminal law.
There was another straw in the wind-this time in a solitary dissent
by Justice Harlan, the grandfather of John Harlan who served on
the Supreme Court in modern times. The elder Harlan, argued in
1884 that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the provisions of
the Bill of Rights. He contended that by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment, the first eight amendments to the federal constitution
had been made applicable to the states. Consequently, any abridge-
ment of those rights by the states would become violations of the
federal constitution.
We shall come to the so-called incorporation theory some fifty
years later. But, in the late nineteenth century, Harlan was the sole
member of the Supreme Court to take that stand as it applied to
personal or individual rights. It is worth noting, incidentally, that
the case in which Harlan first advanced his theory was Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). The criminal defendant there argued
that the provisions of the sixth amendment providing for indictment
by a grand jury had not been observed by the state. Incidentally,
that case is still good law today.
But although Harlan had been in dissent in urging federal super-
vision of personal liberties in the states, he was successful some
thirteen years later in persuading his colleagues that protection of
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property rights was part of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago
Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). In
that case, the Court held that abridgement of property rights was
subject to the requirements of due process and a $1 judgment in
favor of the railroad for loss of its property could not be sustained.
Harlan's most widely known dissent, however, had occurred in the
preceding year in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In that
case, a majority of the Court upheld a Louisiana statute which
required that white and black passengers occupy different cars in a
railroad train. The Court approved the separate but equal doctrine
which was to survive for the next fifty years.
Harlan dissented, arguing that the Constitution was color blind and
"neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." An interesting
side light is that Harlan, the sole Southerner on the Court, was from
Kentucky and had been a slaveholder at one time. The majority
opinion for the Court was written by Justice Brown, a graduate of
Harvard and Yale, born in Massachusetts, and a resident of Michi-
gan. So much for indications of how a particular justice will decide
a case based on background.
Further developments giving constitutional protection to racial
minorities had to wait for another day.
By and large business interests fared well in the Court around the
turn of the century. However, in 1896, a Utah law imposing an eight
hour day for copper miners was upheld as a valid exercise of the
state's police power. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1896). And an
Oregon statute limiting women's work to ten hours a day was also
sustained. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Cf. Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (ten-hour day for male bakers uncon-
stitutional as violating freedom of contract).
Thus, the first years of the Constitution's second century had not
resulted in any startling changes in the approach that had been taken
earlier. The thirteenth amendment, of course, had abolished slavery,
and the fourteenth had granted rights which the courts had construed
very narrowly. The fifteenth amendment had purported to expand
the right to vote, but again in practice had not accomplished much
for the Black race. The federal government still operated on the
theory that protection of individual rights was primarily the obligation
of the states.
But the modern era was upon us. World War I and the sixteenth
amendment permitting direct taxation of the people by the federal
government through the income tax established dominance by the
federal government. These years would also show a change in the
Supreme Court's attitude toward individual liberties.
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Justice Harlan's incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment theory was adopted almost imperceptibly and on
a piecemeal basis in a backhanded and uncertain way. In Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, (1925), the Court wrote: "For present
purposes, we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press" listed in the first amendment "are among the fundamental
personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment from impairment by the states."
This case is often referred to as one which began the process of
incorporation of an amendment by amendment process. Yet, it only
"assumed" that process for purposes of discussion. That is strange
language for a decision announcing such a far reaching doctrine.
Yet, two years later, the Court made no comment about Gitlow's
"assumption" and proceeded to treat incorporation of the first
amendment guarantee of free speech as an accomplished fact. Fiske
v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). Six years later, Gitlow's assumption
had become settled law. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
In 1932, the famous Scottsboro Boys case, Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), applied the sixth amendment right to counsel in
state criminal felony cases under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The religion clauses of the first amendment
had come within the fourteenth amendment, some years earlier, in
1922. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922), and freedom of
assembly followed in 1937, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
You may be surprised perhaps to learn the incorporation theory,
however, has never been applied across the board to all elements of
the Bill of Rights. In 1937, Justice Cardozo in the case of Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), said that double jeopardy was not
an incorporated right. He limited the fourteenth amendment to rights
which were "of the essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" or could
be called "fundamental."
It is interesting that these cases which brought the federal govern-
ment into oversight of civil liberties and increasingly in conflict with
state policies were decided by the same men who regularly set aside
much of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal legislation. The same "nine
old men" who were the subject of his court packing plan, although
conservative in economic measures, had moved the Court toward a
path of increasing concern with individual liberties.
In that era, too, another significant decision was the forerunner
of developments in the area of discrimination in education. In
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), the Court
ordered the state of Missouri to admit a black student to the Missouri
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University Law School. That precedent was followed in two other
university admittance denials in 1950, Sweatt v. Painter, 399 U.S.
629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637
(1950). It may be seen that the groundwork for the landmark case
of Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the 1954
decision prohibiting discrimination in public school education, had
been laid years before. Brown's significance was that it moved into
the broad field of primary education.
In the field of criminal law, the Supreme Court, beginning in the
late 1950's and early 1960's, handed down a series of decisions
intended to improve the procedures used in the states both by police
and the courts. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), are all familiar
names of decisions in which the Court required suspects in custody
to be advised of their rights, be given access to counsel, and to have
protection against unconstitutional searches.
Although these rights were not new, the remedies the Court adopted
for their violation stirred wide controversy. If a confession was
obtained and the defendant had not been advised of his rights, the
confession would be suppressed. Similarly, if as a result of an
unconstitutional search evidence was uncovered, it could not be used
by the prosecutor at the defendant's trial.
This was the Exclusionary Rule which had been criticized by Justice
Cardozo in the 1930's in the pithy phrase, "because the constable
blundered, the guilty go free." Although the Exclusionary Rule led
to widespread criticism, most objective observers agreed that proce-
dures in state criminal matters were much in need of reform and
that the intervention by federal courts had become a necessity.
It is helpful, though, to recall the words of Justice Jackson written
in the course of a dissent in 1949, that we need not "convert the
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact." Terminello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).
In 1965, the Court invoked the idea of the the penumbra or
emanations from the Bill of Rights to announce a constitutionally
protected right of privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), was the first of a series of decisions removing much of the
regulation of sexual conduct from governmental oversight. It cul-
minated in the still highly controversial 1973 decision of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which severely limited the power of
states to prohibit abortions. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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Just five years ago, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982),
the Supreme Court announced that retarded persons were entitled to
constitutional protections under the liberty clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court said that an involuntarily-confined mentally
retarded person is entitled to safe conditions, personal security and
freedom from unwarranted bodily restraint. Thus, the Court recog-
nized the right to human dignity of individuals who are handicapped
through no fault of their own and who are dependent upon the state
for the basic needs of life.
Time does not permit an extended discussion of the many causes
which expanded the reach of the fourteenth amendment in the last
thirty years, both in the criminal and civil liberties field. The litigation
has been explosive in its growth, unmatched in any other area of
our constitutional history.
A case decided in 1961 and virtually unknown outside of legal
circles has had the most dramatic effect in revolutionizing civil rights
litigation. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), was a civil suit for
damages by a family whose home had been subjected to an unjustified
and unconstitutional search by Chicago police. In addition to the
intrusion, the homeowners were subjected to beating by the officers
and the family was harassed and humiliated by the police. Before
Monroe v. Pape was decided, such suits were brought in the state
courts where they were given generally inhospitable treatment.
In Monroe v. Pape, however, the Supreme Court agreed that by
virtue of a statute enacted shortly after the Civil War, now known
familiarly to federal judges as section 1983, such suits could be
brought in the federal courts. That statute had been dormant for
almost one hundred years but now its potential revolutionized the
federal court dockets. A brief review of the statistics will make the
point.
The number of suits brought in reliance on that statute before
1960 was infinitesimal. In that year, there were 280 such suits in the
United States courts; in 1970, 3586; and in 1985, 19,851 cases.
(Federal judicial workload statistics, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts).
A look at the subject matter of Supreme Court's opinions is also
revealing. In the 1935-36 docket, only two of a total of 160 opinions
dealt with basic human freedoms. In 1979-80, 80 of 149 cases fell
into that category.
Charles Evans Hughes was quoted as saying that the Constitution
means what the judges say it does. To a great extent that is true.
The Constitution is always being elaborated on, always being ex-
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plained. And so the text of that brief original document has been so
enlarged that understanding it takes years of study. It is unrealistic
to think that the constitutional law which governs us now is the
same as it was in 1787.
No longer does the federal constitution take a hands-off attitude
toward personal rights and liberties and leave those matters to the
states. Whatever your belief as to the desirability of that shift in
power, however, it is undeniable that it has occurred and it isn't all
bad. At the same time, however, we should not forget that the
framers of the Constitution believed that one way to prevent the
abuse of power was to disperse it.
Although we read in the Federalist of fear that the states might
overwhelm the central government, the opposite has come to pass.
When the states proved unwilling or unable to handle some problems
of government, the federal government stepped in and filled the
vacuum. In the past century, that movement has been particularly
marked in the field of civil rights.
I wonder if now it isn't time for the state governments to reclaim
some of the leadership they have lost in this field. Personal rights
are everybody's business, and the Constitution can be enforced in
state courts as well as federal forums, and we tend to forget that we
have state constitutions which guarantee human liberties.
Although I have emphasized a dichotomy between personal and
property rights, both are guaranteed by the Constitution. Property
rights are human rights too, and there is a fundamental inter-
dependence between the two.
May I conclude by reminding you once again of the difference in
roles of the legislative and judicial branches of the government, a
distinction that is particularly striking when considering constitutional
matters.
Justice Jackson once wrote, "The very purpose of the Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the realm of majorities
and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. One's right to life, liberty and property, to free speech,
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other funda-
mental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elelctions." West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638-42 (1943).
May I close by quoting from a toast given by Chief Judge Gibbon,
of our court, at a dinner of all the federal judges in the Third Circuit
on Constitution Day, September 17, 1987.
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The Constitution of the United States; symbol of the sovereignty of a
free people comprising one great nation; not perfect, for mankind's
handiwork is at best only perfectable; but still the greatest framework
of government for free people yet to be devised.
